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	SPAIN: Terrorist Threats
25X1	Spanish progress toward democracy, spurred by the strong support the government's reform proposals won in the referendum on Wednesday, could be set back if terrorists have actually carried out their threat to kill a prominent political figure kidnaped last weekend.
25X1	The terrorists had demanded the release of 15 terrorists from Spanish prisons in exchange for the release of their hostage—Antonio Marie de Oriol, President of the advisory Council of State and a member of the Council of the Realm. The government refused to yield to this demand. Shortly before the deadline set by the terrorists was due to expire late yesterday, the terrorists raised their demand to include the release of all political prisoners.
25X1	The newspaper which served as intermediary between the government and the terrorists last night received a telephone call stating that Oriol had been executed. A spokesman for the newspaper said he could not confirm the validity of this information.
25X1	The government is in a fairly good position as a result of the unexpectedly strong popular support—some 94 percent of the votes cast—it received in the referendum. Prime Minister Suarez, in his well—received speech to the nation on Tuesday evening, argued persuasively that political violence in Spain is not an outgrowth of the move toward liberalization, pointing out that it was also a feature of the last years of the Franco era.
25X1	Nevertheless, if Oriol has been murdered, the impact on political evolution in Spain could be significant.
25X1	The most immediate danger lies in the threats of far rightist terrorists to retaliate by killing leftist leaders. According to press reports, death threats have been received by Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez, Christian Democrat Ruiz Gimenez and Communists Carrillo and Tamames. Several leftist leaders, including Workers Commission chief Camacho, have been provided with police bodyguards.
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25X1	A series of killings by extremists on the left and right could lead to a spiral of violence and counter-violence that would rapidly involve more and more of the political spectrum. Both far left and the far right would welcome a breakdown in public order. Far rightists hope to provoke a military coup and a return to Francoist repression of the left, while far
	leftists hope to spark a rising of the masses.
25X1	Oriol's death would probably hit the left hardest. Pressure on the government to crack down on leftists of all hues would intensify and the right, humiliated and frustrated by its poor showing in the referendum, would attempt to win the support of staunch conservatives in the military. Pressure from the military would reduce the Prime Minister's flexibility when he negotiates with parties of the moderate left to secure their participation in the legislative election next spring.
25X1	In particular, Oriol's death would complicate the government's efforts to find an arrangement to allow the Communist Party to participate, however indirectly, in the election. The Communist Party's central committee reportedly is "extremely agitated" by the Oriol kidnaping.
25X1	The party denounced the kidnaping and denied any connection with the terrorist group that carried it out, but Communist leaders apparently assume that the military—which remains the main obstacle to legalization of the party—and much of the public will not distinguish between the party and the extremist splinter group that was responsible. The Communists reportedly fear that Oriol's death could set the party's public acceptance back by a "good year."
25X1	A setback to the Communist Party's bid for legalization would strengthen radicals in the party who favor a more militant approach than that advocated by party leader Carrillo. This in turn could lead to increased labor agitation in the pre-election period, when the Spanish economy will be partic-
25X1	ularly vulnerable.

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		25X1
	USSR: Provinces Praise Breshnev	
25X1	Evidence of the growing Brezhnev cult in the USSR apparently is even more plentiful in the provinces than in Moscow as some regional party officials try to outdo one another on the occasion of the party leader's 70th birthday tomorrow.	
25X1	On recent trips to the Russian hinterland and to several cities in Soviet Central Asia, US embassy officers saw prominent pictures of Brezhnev on walls and in windows of public buildings. Brezhnev's writings and memorabilia were displayed in local museums, and pamphlets, books, and phonograph records dedicated to the party leader's accomplishments were being widely sold.	
25X1	Some cities visited had large color portraits of Brezh- nev painted directly on the sides of major public buildings, sug- gesting that these might become permanent features of their urban landscape.	
25X1	One Soviet observed that the prominence given 25 Brezhnev at the Lenin memorial complex in UlyanovskLenin's birthplaceseems to be a sign that Brezhnev is now beginning to be linked to the founder of the Soviet state.	X1 25X1
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5X1	//Following Zambia's decision to adhere to sanctions against Rhodesia in 1973, Kaunda shifted his country's trade	
	patterns so that half of Zambia's exports, including most of its refined copper exports, moved over the Benguela railroad. The	
	closure of this route in 1975 forced Zambia to use the lanzam	
	railroad through Tanzania and other routes.//	
5X1	//Despite these shifts, Zambian exports decreased significantly, contributing along with lower copper prices to the first foreign trade deficit in Zambian history. More recently,	
	the Tanzam railroad has been able to absorb most of Zambia's exports, but Zambia clearly would like to be able to use the Benguela railroad.//	
5X1	//Zaire's problems have been similar but not as severe, partly because of the availability of a local port and	
	partly because Zaire continued to use a third rail route through Zambia and Rhodesia to ports in Mozambique and South Africa. The closure of the route through Rhodesia and Mozambique in early	
	1976 has also narrowed Zaire's transport options.//	
5X1	//In addition, Rhodesian guerrillas have attacked the railroad lines inside Rhodesia, and at least one train carrying Zairian mineral exports was derailed. Zaire also imports coke from Rhodesia for its copper smelters.//	
5X1	//One of the problems in opening the Benguela rail-	
	road is the continuing presence in Angola of National Union forces, which have so far effectively prevented use of the eastern part of the route. The Angolan government is able to run trains as needed between major population centers in the western and central parts of the country.//	
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